Platform competition is ubiquitous, yet platform market structure is little understood. Theory models typically su¤er from equilibrium multiplicityplatforms might coexist or the market might tip to either platform. We use laboratory experiments to study the outcomes of platform competition. When platforms are primarily vertically di¤erentiated, we …nd that even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, markets inevitably tip to the more e¢ cient platform. When platforms are primarily horizontally di¤erentiated, so there is no single e¢ cient platform, we …nd strong evidence of equilibrium coexistence.
Introduction
Platform competition has become increasingly economically important over the last decade. The role of a platform is to act as a matchmaker-that platform connects market participants of various types. Familiar platforms include the online auction site eBay and the online dating site Match.com. However, platforms need not only match buyers to sellers or men to women. Video gaming consoles, such as the Wii, are platforms that match game developers to gamers. The search site Google is a platform that matches searchers with, among other things, relevant ad content provided by sellers. Credit cards, operating systems, and stock exchanges are yet other examples of platforms. 1 Policy makers worry about the potential for a single dominant platform to emerge in such markets. To see why, consider competing online auction platforms. Clearly, the more buyers that are attracted to a platform, the more valuable the platform is to sellers and, consequently, the more sellers it attracts. Of course, this is a virtuous circle with increasingly many buyers and sellers being attracted. This intuition, which is easily formalized, suggests that tipping (i.e., all players selecting the same platform)
is an equilibrium in these markets. Indeed, worries about a dominant platform led to scrutiny by the US Justice Department su¢ cient to scuttle a deal in sponsored search between Google and Yahoo in 2008.
Yet, casual observation suggests that tipping is not inevitable. Consumers enjoy more than one credit card "platform" and users seeking dates have many options besides Match.com. Theory models o¤er two key drivers for multiple platforms to gain positive market shares: The …rst is that "market impact e¤ects" of increased competition from switching platforms are su¢ cient to o¤set scale advantages and prevent a single dominant platform from emerging. The second is that horizontal di¤erentiation between platforms is su¢ cient to o¤set scale e¤ects and thereby avoid the market tipping to a single platform.
In this paper, we investigate both of these drivers of platform coexistence using laboratory experiments to explore the market structure of platforms. Laboratory experiments o¤er a unique opportunity to study how market shares of platforms evolve over the "life cycle"of a market. They have the advantage that, by controlling the payo¤ parameters, one can, in theory, turn platform coexistence on and o¤. They also have the advantage of allowing for a "level playing …eld"for the platforms; thus removing the potential confounding e¤ect of …rst-mover advantages that a platform might enjoy.
Whereas most theory models analyze platforms that are either identical or horizontally di¤erentiated, in practice, platforms often di¤er in quality. For instance, Google has become a leader in bringing Internet users and advertisers to their websites because of their superior search technology. Through their "Relationship Questionnaire," the dating site eHarmony touts their ability to provide more compatible matches than rival sites. In our experiments, we vary both access fees, matching e¢ ciency, and the "…t" between a platform and a user. That is, we can precisely control variations in vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation of platforms along with the surplus provided to users net of access fees.
We begin by o¤ering a class of platform competition games and derive some simple theoretical properties. We do not view this as an important theoretical contribution in its own right. Rather, the theory results provide a unifying framework for studying the market structure of competing matchmakers in the lab. Speci…cally, we conduct a series of experiments in platform competition in which subjects repeatedly participate in two-sided markets over time. Subjects choose one of two competing platforms which di¤er from one another in access fees and matching technologies. In some treatments, coexistence of platforms is possible in equilibrium whereas in others, only tipped equilibria arise.
Our main …ndings are:
1. When platforms are primarily vertically di¤erentiated, even when platform coexistence is theoretically possible, platform competition always leads to tipping.
In short, market impact e¤ects do not lead to platform coexistence in the lab.
2. While theory is (mainly) silent as to which platform the market will tip, the market consistently converges to the Pareto dominant platform. We …nd little evidence of path dependent outcomes where the market gets locked into the "wrong"platform. 3 . When platforms are primarily horizontally di¤erentiated, so there is no Pareto dominant platform, platform competition does not lead to tipping. Markets converge to the outcome predicted under platform coexistence.
The paper proceeds as follows. The remainder of this section reviews the related literature on platform competition. Section 2 presents results from a simple theory model of platform competition which forms the basis for most of the games played in the experiment. Section 3 presents our experimental design. Section 4 presents the results of the experiments when platforms are vertically di¤erentiated. Section 5 presents the results of experiments when platforms are undi¤erentiated or horizontally di¤erentiated. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of all theoretical results are relegated to the appendix.
Related Literature
A key question addressed in the growing theory literature on platform competition is market structure-whether multiple competing platforms can coexist or not. In some of the earliest work in the area, Jullien (2001, 2003) found that coexistence is a knife-edge case when platforms are undi¤erentiated. These models, however, exclude the possibility that additional "players"on a given side of the market might have an adverse "market impact" e¤ect on others. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ellison, Fudenberg, and Möbius (2004) demonstrate that, when market impact e¤ects are su¢ ciently large, platform coexistence is restored even when platforms are undi¤erentiated. Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) point out that this conclusion is sensitive to the "size"of the individual players on the platform. In particular, when players are atomistic and platforms are undi¤erentiated, only tipped equilibria remain. A separate line of the theory literature explores the possibility that platforms are horizontally di¤erentiated. Here the conclusions are that, with su¢ cient di¤erentiation, coexistence is possible even when platforms have access to a rich set of pricing strategies (see, e.g., Tirole, 2002, 2003; Armstrong, 2006 ; as well as Damiano and Li, 2008; and Ambrus and Argenziano, 2009 ). Using a somewhat di¤erent approach, Economides and Katsamakas (2006) analyze market competition between an open source technology platform and a proprietary platform and …nd that many di¤erent compositions of the market shares are possible depending on demand for each of the systems.
While less theoretical attention has been paid to the case where competing platforms are vertically di¤erentiated, much of the empirical work in the area has centered on this question. 2 Indeed, the QWERTY phenomenon-the idea that a vertically inferior platform might prevail owing to path dependence-has been profoundly in ‡uential and controversial (see, e.g., David 1985; Margolis, 1990, 1994) .
More recent work in the area uses consumer reviews to try to identify the "better" platform and then examine subsequent market share. (see, e.g. Tellis, 2009). The main conclusion of this work is that, when a dominant platform emerges, it tends to be of higher quality than its rivals. Of course, identifying causality is di¢ cult-platform quality is a "moving target"that changes with the resources of the competing …rms.
Thus, a platform might be dominant because it is of higher quality or, it may have higher quality through the resources gained by its dominance.
There has been little connection between the empirical studies and the key features of the environment identi…ed by the theory. 3 An important reason for this seeming disconnect is the di¢ culty in measuring the features highlighted in the theory. For instance, determining the exact magnitude of horizontal di¤erentiation or market impact e¤ects in a convincing fashion poses a substantial challenge. Our approach of using laboratory experiments provides a useful complement. While obviously lacking the realism of …eld data, our controlled environments enable us to precisely measure and perturb key features of the model that theory suggest are important in determin-ing platform coexistence versus tipping. It also enables us to explore the QWERTY question without the problem of reverse causality.
Our work adds to a growing literature that uses laboratory experiments to examine questions in industrial organization. 4 However, once again these markets are experimentally one sided. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to study two-sided markets under a wide array of treatments in the lab. 5 Crucial to the tipping phenomenon is the fact that there are gains from coordination in two-sided markets. There is an enormous experimental literature on coordination games (see Ochs, 1995 for a survey). Two key di¤erences between our experiments and standard coordination games are the fact that there are two types of players trying to match with one another and, more importantly, the presence of market impact e¤ects-more competitors on the same "side" of the market reduces payo¤s to each player on that side-a feature not shared with commonly studied coordination game experiments.
Theory
In this section, we describe a class of platform competition games and study their equilibrium properties. The main purpose of this section is to provide a simple but general theoretical framework for the experiments-most of our treatments represent examples in this class of games. Consider a platform competition game where there are N 2 agents of each of two types. Agents simultaneously choose to locate on one of two platforms, labeled A and B. If an agent chooses to locate on platform i, she has to pay an up-front access fee of p i . She earns a gross payo¤ of u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) where n 1 and n 2 respectively denote the number of agents of her own type and of the opposite type locating on platform i. An agent's net payo¤ from choosing platform i is then u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) p i . Payo¤s depend only on the platform an agent selects and numbers of her own and the complementary type that locate on that platform. The access fees are exogenously given and neither access fees nor gross payo¤s depend directly on the agent's type. Agents of the two types are symmetric and homogeneous in their preferences for the two competing platforms.
We restrict attention to games with generic payo¤s. Speci…cally, suppose that p A > p B , u i (N; N ) > p i and it is not the case that for all i, j, n 1 and n 2 , u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) p i = u j (n 1 ; n 2 ) p j . Finally, we make the following assumptions on gross payo¤ functions:
Assumption 1 (market size e¤ect): Gross payo¤s are increasing in the number of players of the opposite type. For all n 1 ; n 2 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g, u i (n 1 ; n 2 + 1) > u i (n 1 ; n 2 ). Assumption 2 (market impact e¤ect): Gross payo¤s are decreasing in the number of players of own type. For all n 1 ; n 2 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g, u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) > u i (n 1 + 1; n 2 ).
Assumption 3 (scale e¤ect):
Gross payo¤ increase when the number of players of both types on the platform increase equally. For all n 1 ; n 2 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g, u i (n 1 + 1; n 2 + 1) > u i (n 1 ; n 2 ).
Assumption 4: For all i; j; u j (1; 0) p j < u i (N; N ) p i :
Assumption 4 merely rules out the possibility that an agent would prefer to be alone on a platform rather than being on a platform in which all other agents are located. With these assumptions in place, one can show the following useful property of any Nash equilibrium for this class of games.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, the same number of both types select a given platform.
This result comes from the symmetric nature of the two types. To see this, consider an online dating setting. Suppose more men than women join platform A in equilibrium. Then it must be that, for a man on platform A, the cost saving from switching to platform B is outweighed by the loss in gross payo¤ from switching. But if the gross payo¤s on platform B are so low, then surely it will be pro…table for women on this platform to switch to A: After all, the gender ratio on A is even more favorable for women than it is for men. Thus, gender ratios must be equal across platforms in equilibrium.
As standard in the literature, a tipped equilibrium refers to a Nash equilibrium where all players locate on one of the two platforms. No player locates on the other platform. On the other hand, given the results of Lemma 1, a coexisting equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium where n players of each type locates on one platform and N n players of each type locates on the other platform where 0 < n < N . While the model always has tipped equilibria, coexisting equilibria exist under speci…c conditions as described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Tipping is always an equilibrium. Furthermore, any 0 < n < N such
is an equilibrium where n players of each type to choose platform A with the remainder choosing platform B:
Tipping comprises an equilibrium for the usual reasons. However, since the model nests all of the e¤ects described in the extant literature, coexistence can arise for two reasons. Along the lines of Caillaud and Jullien, fee di¤erences can o¤set market size e¤ects to produce coexistence. Along the lines of Ellison and Fudenberg, market impact e¤ects can o¤set scale e¤ects to produce coexistence. Equation (1) highlights the interaction of these two possibilities-the outside inequalities represent market impact e¤ects while the center inequality represents the fee di¤erence e¤ect.
One might worry that interior equilibria arising in this model are "knife-edge" in the sense that any small perturbation in agent strategies leads to tipping. This is not the case. Generically, when a coexisting or interior equilibrium exists, it is a strict Nash equilibrium, i.e., equation (1) holds with strict inequality for a dense set of parameter values. In the experiments, we choose parameter values such that any interior equilibrium is strict.
Proposition 2 There is a unique Pareto dominant equilibrium. It consists of tipping
While platform competition generally leads to equilibrium multiplicity, Proposition 2 shows that, by applying the Pareto re…nement, one always obtains a unique prediction. Of course, there are many coordination games where the unique Pareto dominant prediction performs poorly. In these games, applying a risk dominance re…nement is often a better predictor. For the class of games we study, one can show that the risk dominance re…nement excludes interior equilibria but can o¤er no general results beyond this without imposing further restrictions on the gross payo¤ functions. When both platforms have the same matching technology, Pareto and risk dominance lead to the same prediction. When platforms are di¤erentiated, this is not necessarily the case, a fact we exploit in some of our experimental treatments.
We do not analyze platform competition where agents have heterogeneous preferences over the platforms. A comprehensive study of such models can be quite involved and is beyond the scope of this paper. We run a very speci…c set of experiments with heterogeneous agents and we discuss equilibria in our particular experimental settings later in the relevant sections.
Experimental Design
We designed the experiments to operationalize the notion of di¤erent participant types choosing between platforms with varying access fees and levels of e¢ ciency. Each session consisted of four sets, consisting of 15 periods. 6 At the beginning of a set, a participant was randomly assigned a type of either a "square"or a "triangle,"
and randomly matched with three other players. These four players, two of each type, comprised a market. 7 During each period, players in a market simultaneously chose which of two platforms, named "…rm %" and "…rm #," to locate on. We informed subjects about the access fee for each platform and how much they would earn as a function of how many of each type located on each platform. These gross payo¤s were presented in the form of payo¤ matrices. After each period, subjects learned how many of each type located on each platform, and how many points they earned.
At the end of a set, each subject was randomly reassigned a new type, randomly re-matched into a new market, and shown a new set of payo¤s. At the conclusion of a session, each subject was compensated based on cumulative points earned. In all but four sessions, subjects of a given type were homogeneous in the sense that all subjects were given the same gross payo¤ matrices and access fees. In sessions with heterogeneous subjects (sessions 23 to 28), the two subjects of a given type faced di¤erent sets of access fees to the platforms. The Appendix provides the instructions used in one of the sessions and payo¤ matrices used in all the sessions.
We divide the sessions into two groups. In the …rst 20 sessions, conducted between 
Treatments
Within each session, sets alternated as No Tip (N) or Tip (T). While tipping to either platform were Nash equilibria in all treatments, the payo¤s in N sets additionally supported a strict Nash equilibrium in the interior. To control for presentation e¤ects, half of the sessions began with an N set (referred to as an NTNT session) while the other half began with a T set (referred to as a TNTN session). We opted for a within-subjects design for two reasons. First, this design allows for session level controls while varying the treatments. Second, compared to a between-subjects design, which would have repeated the same treatment 60 times, we felt varying the payo¤s would lead subjects to be more attentive to the game. Platforms were either homogeneous or vertically di¤erentiated in a given session.
In homogeneous sessions, platforms had identical payo¤s but di¤erent access fees.
In di¤erentiated sessions, platforms di¤ered both in payo¤s and access fees. Table   1 summarizes the treatments as well as several theoretical benchmarks in the …rst 20 sessions. The column labeled "Cheap Heuristic Prediction" is a prediction based on the heuristic strategy of simply choosing the platform with the lower access fee.
We label the platforms A and B in the remainder of the paper, where B denotes the platform with the cheaper access fee. We describe each treatment in detail in Section 4 below. The results of these treatments led us to run subsequent experiments conducted in 2009. Those are described in detail in Section 5. The remainder of the section analyzes each treatment and shows that the two …ndings are robust to market size and platform di¤erentiation.
Treatment

Number of Players in a Market
Number of Sessions
Homogeneous platforms
We …rst consider the case where platforms are homogeneous-equally e¢ cient in matching agents. These are the experimental analogs to the theory models of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) , as well as Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) .
For homogeneous treatments, the payo¤ structure as a function of the subject's choice and the proportions of each type locating on the subject's platform was identical for the two platforms; that is u i (n 1 ; n 2 ) = u j (n 1 ; n 2 ) for all n 1 ; n 2 . However, the platforms did di¤er in their access fees. Both Pareto dominance and risk dominance o¤er the same prediction-tipping to the platform with the lower access fee. The cheap heuristic shares this prediction.
Homogeneous Although we are mostly interested in the market level results, we start by looking at entire sessions …rst. 8 Figure 1 presents a time series of the percentages of players choosing the cheaper platform in all the NTNT and TNTN sessions.
Once a market converges to the cheaper platform, the market stays tipped there throughout the session. As the …gure shows, there is little evidence of a presentation e¤ect. 9 Figure 2 displays the fraction of all markets that tipped by the end of each 10period set, as well as to where they tipped. We say that a market has tipped to a particular platform by the end of a set if all subjects in that market choose that speci…c platform in each of the last three periods of that set. Since we ran six sessions with four markets per session, each of the bars in the …gure represents twenty-four markets. Tipping is prevalent (occurring more than 90% of the time in each set) and systematic-markets only tipped to the platform with the cheaper access fee.
Existence of a non-tipped equilibrium had virtually no e¤ect on behavior. First, there were only three markets where tipping did not occur, and two of these were in Tip (T) sets, where there was no interior equilibrium. One might argue that tipping occurred because the markets were small and hence coordination was easy. Our next set of treatments complicates the coordination problem by doubling the size of the market. Homogeneous-Large For these treatments, there were eight participants comprising a market. We also increased the length of a set to 15 periods anticipating the coordination di¢ culties of a larger group. Since the session-wise dynamics of platform choice are similar to the homogeneous treatment, we only present market-level behavior in the last three periods of each set. Figure 3 reproduces the analysis of We were surprised to …nd the markets reaching the Pareto dominant outcome as quickly as in the Homogeneous treatment, if not faster, when we increased the size of each market. This suggests that ease of coordination in smaller markets was not driving tipping. Of course, one might argue tipping occurred because of the focality of the "better" platform in the homogeneous case. When platforms di¤er in their e¢ ciency and access fees, identifying the "better" platform is more of a challenge.
To study this possibility, we next investigate markets with vertically di¤erentiated platforms.
Vertically Di¤erentiated Platforms
When a given number of own and other type agents receive di¤erent gross payo¤s for the two platforms, we say that platforms are di¤erentiated. A simple way in which this might occur is if one platform had a superior matching technology to the other.
We model this by choosing payo¤s such that u A (n 1 ; n 2 ) > u B (n 1 ; n 2 ) for all (n 1 ; n 2 ) pairs with n 1 ; n 2 > 0. As before, platforms di¤er in their access fees. Here we were able to test whether adding a second dimension, platform quality, changes market outcomes.
Di¤erentiated As shown in Table 1 , the market tipping to the cheaper platform B
is still both a Pareto and risk dominant equilibrium in this treatment. Figure 4 shows subjects overwhelmingly chose the more e¢ cient platform B. While we have been interpreting the results of the experiments as supporting the Pareto or risk dominant predictions with strategic players, the data is also consistent with non-strategic players who merely locate on the platform with the cheaper access fee. Our next section seeks to distinguish between these two hypotheses.
Di¤erentiated-Cheap By varying the di¤erence in the access fees as well as the degree of vertical di¤erentiation, there are parameter values where the Pareto dominant platform is not the cheaper one. Thus, we can distinguish strategic behavior from the "cheap"heuristic. In these sessions we chose the gross payo¤s and platform subscription fees such that market tipping to the more expensive platform is the Pareto dominant equilibrium. The session-wise dynamics for this treatment are shown in Figure 5 . Interestingly, in the …rst set of the NTNT sessions, around 75% of subjects chose the Pareto dominant platform giving the overall market a "non-tipped" look. It is, however, instructive to examine each of the 4-player "markets"separately, as shown in Figure   6 . In the …rst set, we …nd 75% of markets tipped to the Pareto dominant platform and 6% tipped to the cheap platform. Thus, at least initially, there is some evidence of market tipping to the less e¢ cient (in net terms) platform. From set two onwards, however, 100% of markets tipped to the Pareto dominant, but more expensive, platform. Interestingly, 3 out of the 4 players from the market tipping to the cheaper platform in the …rst set chose the Pareto dominant platform from the beginning of the second set, after having been randomly reassigned to a new market group. As with all the previous treatments, there is no evidence of platform coexistence. None of the treatments o¤ered so far have the ‡avor of "stag hunt"type gamesthe Pareto prediction corresponds exactly to the risk dominant prediction. Both theory and experiments suggest that when these two predictions diverge, the risk dominant prediction often prevails. 10 The next set of sessions seeks to di¤erentiate between these two predictions.
Di¤erentiated-Risk Dominant
A simple way to separate the Pareto and risk dominant predictions without disturbing the rest of the structure of the game is to increase the "upside"from mistakes on the Pareto inferior platform. To operationalize this, we simply change a single (o¤ equilibrium) payo¤ cell to increase the market size e¤ect for this platform. Since the risk dominance prediction is in ‡uenced by payo¤s from mistakes while the Pareto re…nement is not, this change has the e¤ect of separating the two. In our experiments, tipping to the more expensive platform is the Pareto dominant equilibrium, while tipping to the cheaper platform is the risk dominant equilibrium. The results are much more nuanced in this treatment. The session-wise dynamics, as seen in Figure 7 , do not suggest convergence. Nevertheless, a much higher percentage of subjects chose the Pareto dominant platform at the end of each session than at the beginning. When we look at 4-player markets separately in Figure 8 , we see that a majority of markets did, in fact, converge. In the …rst set, the majority of tipped markets converged to the risk-dominant platform. However, as subjects gained experience, tipping increasingly favored the Pareto dominant platform. By set four, 92%
of markets had tipped, and, of these, 69% tipped to the Pareto dominant platform.
For the …rst time in the experiment, the market converged to a coexisting outcome:
once in an N set and once in a T set (where this outcome was not an equilibrium). In our experiment, markets were more likely to tip to the Pareto dominant rather than the risk dominant platform by the end of the sessions. We can use a Pearson
Chi-Squared test to examine the null hypothesis that conditional on market tipping, there is an equal chance of tipping to either platform. Although we cannot reject this null hypothesis for the …rst three sets, we can reject it with a p-value of 0.07 for set four. In other words, there is modest statistical support that Pareto dominance is a better predictor of (experienced) market tipping behavior.
Is Tipping Inevitable?
Our previous results suggest that tipping is an inevitable consequence of platform competition. Regardless of whether markets are large or small, whether platforms are homogeneous or vertically di¤erentiated, or whether there is a coexisting equilibrium or not, platform competition eventually gave way to tipping-mainly to the Paretodominant platform. Perhaps the mere presence of a Pareto dominant platform is the main driver for tipping. To investigate this possibility, we modi…ed payo¤s in two ways to eliminate a Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Cloned Platforms Let us return to the homogeneous platforms. As we saw, when access fees di¤er, there is a Pareto dominant equilibrium and the market quickly tips to it. But suppose that the access fees were the same. In that case, the platforms would be clones and neither would be Pareto dominant. Since the platforms are symmetric, one might speculate that the outcome would be symmetric as well-each platform would enjoy 50% market share.
To examine this possibility, we ran two additional sessions of our homogeneouslarge treatment in February 2009, but with identical access fees. When platforms are homogeneous and access fees identical, both platforms having equal market share always comprises an interior equilibrium. For the erstwhile "T" treatment, this is the only interior equilibrium while under the "N" treatment, unequal market shares also comprise interior equilibria. Since coordination is important in this game, we randomized the order in which we displayed the radio buttons for platform choice.
In one session, platform "#"is on top, while, in the other, platform "%"is on top.
Our results may be easily summarized: Despite the existence of multiple interior equilibria, markets never converged to these outcomes. Instead, most markets tipped.
As subjects gained experience, they learned to coordinate on whichever platform was displayed on the top of the screen. Figure 9 illustrates the pattern of tipping.
To summarize, when platforms are homogeneous, even when the focality of a We chose parameters such that two interior equilibria, in addition to the tipped equilibria, always existed. In one such equilibrium, each agent goes to the platform where she gets a discount. In the other coexisting equilibrium, each agent goes to the platform that is more expensive for her. Moreover, in half the sets, the parameters were such that a tipped equilibrium was Pareto dominant. In the other half, there was no Pareto dominant tipped equilibrium. Sets alternated between these treatments.
To begin, we examine the impact of horizontal di¤erentiation when there is a
Pareto dominant tipped equilibrium. That is, the discounts players receive for their preferred platform do not dominate payo¤ di¤erence between platforms on the vertical dimension. Figure 10 displays the results. As the …gure makes clear, merely adding horizontal di¤erentiation does not alter the broad tendency of these markets to tip. In set 1, six of the eight markets converged to the Pareto dominant platform ("Platform 1" in the …gure), while in sets 2-4, seven of eight converged. Below, we will account for the non-tipping markets.
If we increase the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation to the point where it dominates the vertical di¤erentiation, this leads to a situation in which neither platform is universally preferred. Figure 11 below displays the results for this treatment. While tipping was the norm in Figure 10 , it is the exception in Figure 11 . Strikingly, by the fourth set, none of the markets tipped. When the horizontal di¤erentiation dominates vertical di¤erences, the tipped equilibria lose much of their attractive power.
What happened when markets did not tip? One possibility, suggested by the results above under the Di¤erentiated-RD treatment, is that these markets simply never converged at all. Another possibility is that they converged to one of the two coexisting equilibria. Figure 12 displays the frequency with which the market converged to the coexisting equilibrium where agents go to their discounted platforms.
Out of the …ve markets that did not tip to the Pareto dominant platform (in the treatment where there was such a platform), three of these converged to this coexisting equilibrium while the remaining two did not converge at all. When there was no Pareto dominant platform, most markets converged to this coexisting equilibrium.
By set 4, seven of eight markets converged to this outcome. Thus, with su¢ cient horizontal di¤erentiation, tipping is not the inevitable outcome of platform competition.
Instead, coexistence is the most likely outcome. 11 Analyzing this …gure together with 
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite network e¤ects that would seem to favor coordination on a single platform, in many markets, multiple platforms coexist. Recent theory models rationalize coexistence by appealing to two forces that restrain consolidation: fee di¤erences between platforms and market impact e¤ects. When these forces are large, they are su¢cient to o¤set the scale bene…ts to a user joining the larger platform, thus allowing di¤erent size platforms to coexist. When these forces are small, however, network effects dominate and equilibrium predicts that the market will tip to a single platform.
We investigated this explanation for coexistence using laboratory experiments. Our main treatment was to vary the strength of these forces, thus turning on and o¤ the presence of an interior equilibrium.
When platforms were undi¤erentiated or vertically di¤erentiated, markets never converged to an interior equilibrium regardless of the size of these forces. Instead, the overwhelming majority of markets tipped to a single platform. Thus, even when coexistence was theoretically possible, it was a poor description of market behavior.
But which platform emerged as the winner? A source of continuing fascination to economists is the possibility that markets will tip to an ine¢ cient platform. Anecdotes along these lines abound, ranging from the QWERTY keyboard to the VHS format for videocassettes (see Katz and Shapiro, 1994) . Underlying this worry is the simple observation that, in the presence of scale e¤ects, tipping to either platform comprises an equilibrium. This is true in our experiments as well.
While tipping to the inferior platform was theoretically possible, it too was a poor description of market behavior. In our experiments, outcomes where users got locked into the inferior platform were fairly rare and typically remedied over time. Indeed, the market never tipped to the inferior platform when the more e¢ cient platform was also less risky. When there was a trade-o¤ between risk and e¢ ciency, some markets did initially converge to the inferior platform; however, with experience, markets increasingly tipped to the e¢ cient platform.
Allowing Obviously, there are a number of limitations to using our study as a basis for understanding real world platform competition. One limitation is that, owing to space constraints in the laboratory, our experimental markets are small relative to their real-world counterparts. Small markets might seem to bias the results in favor of tipping since coordination is easier. At the same time, however, small markets might also bias the results in favor of coexistence since the competitive impact of an additional individual on a platform is likely to be more pronounced. Interestingly, when we doubled the size of the experimental market, we found more evidence of tipping in the larger market. A second potential limitation of our study is the external validity of the subject pool. In our view, undergraduates are not all that dissimilar to a typical platform user. Undergraduates are large consumers of video gaming consoles, online auctions, online dating sites, and search engines.
In our experiments, platforms compete on an even playing …eld-neither platform enjoys the …rst-mover advantage of an existing base of users. QWERTY e¤ects are often attributed to a …rst-mover advantage enjoyed by the inferior platform. In the situation of pure vertical di¤erentiation, we showed in a companion paper (see Hossain and Morgan, 2009) that our conclusions are substantially unaltered by introducing …rst-mover advantage: Even if the inferior platform enjoys a monopoly at the start of the game, the introduction of competition still quickly leads to tipping to e¢ cient platform. One common feature of many two-sided markets that we do not explore is the issue of multi-homing, which we plan to tackle in the future.
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Since n 1 > n 2 , it then follows that u A (n 1 ; n 2 ) u A (n 2 + 1; n 2 ) < u A (n 2 + 1; n 1 )
where the weak inequality follows from Assumption 2 and the strict inequality follows from Assumption 1. Moreover,
where again weak inequality follows from Assumption 2 and the strict inequality follows from Assumption 1.
Therefore, combining equations (3) and (4) ;we have that u A (n 2 + 1; n 1 ) u B (N n 2 ; N n 1 ) > u A (n 1 ; n 2 ) u B (N n 1 + 1; N n 2 ) :
Then, using equation (2),we obtain u A (n 2 + 1; n 1 ) u B (N n 2 ; N n 1 ) > p A p B which may be rewritten as
But this implies that a square type agent located on platform B can pro…t from unilaterally deviating to platform A. This is a contradiction; therefore n 1 = n 2 in any equilibrium. An identical argument shows that tipping to platform B is an equilibrium. Now suppose there exists an interior equilibrium. By Lemma 1, we know that any interior equilibrium is generically characterized by n < N of each type choosing platform A and N n of each type choosing platform B. Such an equilibrium will exist if the market impact e¤ect and the fee di¤erences are strong enough to deter tipping. This just requires that there exists n < N such that u A (n; n) p A u B (N n + 1; N n) p B and u B (N n; N n) p B u A (n + 1; n) p A :
That is, players at neither platform have any incentive to unilaterally change their locations. This also implies that there is n < N such that p A p B 2 [u A (n + 1; n) u B (N n; N n) ; u A (n; n) u B (N n + 1; N n)] :
Here the price di¤erential is such that unilaterally relocating to a di¤erent platform does not increase net payo¤ for any player.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We …rst show that tipping is a necessary condition for Pareto dominance.
Consider some interior equilibrium where n of each type of agent visit platform A.
By Assumption 3,
and since tipping to platform A is also an equilibrium, this contradicts the notion that the interior equilibrium is Pareto dominant.
Thus, if a Pareto dominant equilibrium exists, it consists of tipping to one of the platforms. With generic payo¤s suppose that for some i; u i (N; N ) p i > u j (N; N ) p j . Hence, tipping to platform i Pareto dominates tipping to platform j: Since this exhausts the set of equilibria, Pareto dominance always selects a unique equilibriumtipping to platform i:
A Sample Instruction Sheet from a Homogeneous NTNT Session
Name:
Student ID:
Instructions General Rules
This session is part of an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the session.
There are sixteen people in this room who are participating in this session. They have all been recruited in the same way as you and are reading the same instructions as you are for the first time. It is important that you do not talk to any of the other participants in the room until the session is over.
The session will consist of 40 periods, in each of which you can earn points. At the end of the experiment you will be paid based on your total point earnings from all 40 periods. Each point is worth 50 cents. Thus, if you earn y points from the experiment then your total income will be HKD y/2. Notice that the more points you earn, the more cash you will receive.
Description of a Period
At the start of period 1, you will be randomly matched with exactly three other subjects in the room and will be designated as either a square or a triangle player. You and these three others form a "market" consisting of exactly two triangle players and two square players. During periods 1 through 10 you will be playing with the same three other people and retain the same type (square or triangle). At the start of period 11, you will be randomly matched with three other people in the room and randomly designated the types square or triangle and will play in a new market. The same thing will happen at the start of periods 21 and 31. Thus, the people with whom you are participating will change every ten periods and your type may also change.
In each period, you will decide between joining either one of two competing firms (labeled "firm %" and "firm #"). If you join firm #, you pay a subscription fee of 4 points and if you join the firm %, you pay a subscription fee of 2 points. The three other players in your market will also individually decide on which firm to join at the same time as you. On your screen, click on the firm (% or #) that you want to join. After you click "OK," a new box will pop up to confirm that you are certain about your choice. If you want to stay with your choice, please click "yes" and click "no" otherwise. If you click "no," you will go back to the initial box that allows you to choose one of the firms. When all the players in the market have made their decisions, you will learn your payoffs.
At the end of the period, for each firm, you will learn the number of players of each type that joined that firm in that period. Your net payoff depends on the numbers of players of each type in the firm that you join as well as that firm's subscription fee. Once you join a firm, before paying the subscription fee, in rounds 1-10, you will earn a gross payoff according to Table 1 . The two columns present your gross payoffs when the number of players of your type (including yourself) in the firm you choose is 1 and 2 respectively. The three rows present your gross payoffs when the number of players of your opposite type in the firm you choose is 0, 1 or 2 respectively. You will be able to see the table on your screen during these periods.
Table 1. Gross payoffs before paying the subscription fee in periods 1-10 and 21-30
Number of players of your own type (including yourself) in the firm you joined 1 2 Number of players of the opposite type in the firm you joined 0 5 5 1 9 6 2 12 11 The subscription fee is 2 points for firm % and 4 points for firm #. At the end of the period, you will see your net payoff (your gross payoff minus your firm's subscription fee) in points from that period. At the end of every 10 periods, you will see your net payoffs from all previous periods.
Differences between periods
At the start of period 11, your payoffs will change. Specifically, in rounds 11-20, you will earn gross payoffs (before paying the subscription fee) according to the following table: Table 2 . Gross payoffs before paying the subscription fee in periods 11-20 and 31-40
Number of players of your own type (including yourself) in the firm you joined 1 2 Number of players of the opposite type in the firm you joined 0 5 5 1 9 8 2 12 11 Once again, you will be able to see the table on your screen during these periods. Also, remember that the subscription fee is 2 points for firm % and 4 points for firm #.
The payoffs in periods 21-30 are calculated in the same way as in periods 1-10 using Table 1 . The payoffs in periods 31-40 are calculated in the same way as in periods 11-20 using Table 2 .
Ending the session
At the end of period 40, you will see a screen displaying your total earnings for the experiment. Recall that, if you earn y points in total from the experiment, your total income from the experiment would be HKD y/2. You will be paid this amount in cash.
Payoff Matrices for Other Settings
For the remaining four settings, we present the gross payoffs for both N and T games using one table for conciseness. With differentiated platforms, the entry (u A , u B ) lists the payoffs from platforms A and B respectively. For the outcomes where the gross payoffs are different for the two games, we present the T game payoffs inside parentheses.
Gross Payoffs for the Homogeneous-Large Treatment
The platform subscription fees were p A = 6 and p B =2 in this treatment. For both N and T games, the gross payoff equals 22 for a player who is the only one of her type to choose platform B while both players of the other type choose platform B in the Differentiated-RD treatment instead of 11 as in the Differentiated-Cheap treatment.
